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The objective of this paper is to empirically analyze the relationship between job ﬂows
and regional income stabilization provided by the national tax and transfer systems. The
analysis is based on an administrative panel data set containing all sectors in 20 Swedish
regions for the time period 1989-2000. Controlling for unobserved regional eﬀects we ﬁnd
that a high net tax-income ratio tends to decrease the rate of jobs that are created and
increase the rate of job destruction, increasing the overall rate of job reallocation in the
regions. In an attempt to separate out the part of the national tax-transfer system that is
aimed at stabilizing the income path over time we ﬁnd that only job creation is aﬀected, i.e.,
regions where the income path is more stable te n dt oh a v eal o w e rr a t eo fi n t r a - i n d u s t r yj o b
creation.
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This paper analyzes labor market eﬀects of insurance against large variations in disposable in-
come over the business cycle provided by the ﬁscal system. A suﬃcient degree of mobility of
factors of production between ﬁrms, industries and lines of businesses is often seen as a precon-
dition for the economy to adapt to permanent or temporary shocks and to maintain an eﬃcient
allocation of resources. In the labor market, these changes are reﬂected as reallocation of jobs
between ﬁrms and industries. However, ﬁrms and individuals may take action in order to reduce
the uncertainty regarding future incomes induced by economic changes. This is accomplished
through the private insurance market and by other types of preventive actions. For instance,
an individual may invest in higher education in order to reduce her risk of being unemployed
and to increase her ability to adjust to new conditions. Firms may obtain regular insurance or
insurance via forward markets where agents act in order to buy and sell commodities at a ﬁxed
price for future delivery.
Due to obvious problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, the national government’s
control system is sometimes better suited to monitor risk among citizens and the government
can therefore act as a complement to the private insurance market. For instance, the national
tax and transfer systems provide insurance against variation in personal income (hence, stabi-
lizing income) since those unemployed often pay less income taxes while in many cases receive
unemployment beneﬁt funds. There are a number of studies that have empirically analyzed
labor market eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁts and labor market regulations. Using European
cross-country data, Gómez-Salvador et al. (2004) ﬁnd that generous unemployment beneﬁts
decrease job turnover. Obstfeld and Peri (2000) ﬁnd similar results for labor mobility and they
also ﬁnd that generous welfare systems tend to reduce labor market eﬃciency.
This paper contributes to the literature in at least two aspects. Firstly, in addition to
studying the eﬀe c to fo v e r a l ln e tt a x e so nj o bﬂows, we speciﬁcally attempt to separate out
the eﬀect of the stabilization (risk sharing) mechanism of the ﬁscal system. Note that the
stabilization mechanism refers to not only unemployment beneﬁts but also other aspects of
the ﬁscal system that are relevant to workers and ﬁrms, such as taxes, sickness beneﬁts, social
allowances etc. Secondly, by focusing on the case of Sweden, we have access to very detailed
data on both national tax and tranfser payments at the local level and plant level employment
data, where the latter allows us to calculate regional job ﬂows within industries. Even though
the structure of the national ﬁscal system in Sweden is equal for all regions, Andersson (2004)
ﬁnds evidence of regional diﬀerences in the actual extent of smoothing provided by the ﬁscal
system. Consequently, even if this is not the objective, the tax and transfer systems tend to
redistribute individual income risks across regions. Thus, this paper contributes to the literature
by highlighting potential beneﬁts and drawbacks of the design of the tax and transfer systems
1with respect to stabilization. This is of importance from a policy perspective since it can answer
the question of whether the ﬁscal system aﬀects the economy’s ability to adjust to new conditions.
The analysis in this paper is based on an administrative panel data set covering all sectors
in 20 Swedish regions during the period 1989-2000 .A c c o r d i n gt ot h em a i nr e s u l t s ,ah i g hn e t
tax-income ratio tends to decrease the rate of jobs that are created and increase the rate of job
destruction, increasing the overall rate of intra-industry job reallocation in the Swedish regions.
Separating out the income stabilizing part of the tax-transfer system we ﬁnd that only job
creation is aﬀected. It turns out that regions where the income path is more stable over time
tend to have a lower rate of intra-industry job creation.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section contains a discussion of the mechanisms
behind job ﬂows and how this relates to policy. Section 3 presents a way to empirically mea-
sure stabilization, while Section 4 describes the empirical speciﬁcation for job ﬂows. Data are
described in Section 5. The empirical results are discussed in Section 6 and the paper concludes
with Section 7.
2 Shocks, stabilization and job ﬂows
Davis et al. (1996) deﬁne job creation and job destruction as changes in employment between two
years due to expansion and contraction of ﬁrms, respectively. The rate of gross job reallocation
is the sum of job creation and job destruction. Theoretical work regarding the importance
of idiosyncratic shocks in explaining the cyclical behavior of job creation and job destruction
found in data is often based on a general equilibrium matching model; see e.g. Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994, 2001) and Pissarides (2000).1 Matching between posted vacancies and the
labor force is given by a matching function, which means that the labor market is imperfect,
giving rise to unemployment. Thus, only a proportion of the total number of individuals in
the labor force will be employed and market tightness, measured by the vacancy-unemployment
ratio, will aﬀect the successfulness of the matching process, i.e. job creation. It is important to
note that job creation takes place when a vacant job is ﬁlled by a worker, i.e., when there is a
successful match between a job and a worker. Thus, a vacancy per se is not suﬃcient for job
creation.
Ex ante, ﬁrms decide upon location and technology. Output is produced with productivity
equal to px,w h e r ep is aggregate productivity in the locality and x is an idiosyncratic job-speciﬁc
shock, which can be persistent. When a shock arrives the ﬁrm can either decide to continue
production with the existing job or close the job down if the shock reveals that productivity
falls below a critical value, px < R,w h e r eR is the reservation productivity.
1For a discussion about dismissal delays and severance payments through wage contracts as a means of income
insurance against risk, see e.g. Pissarides (2002).
2Andersson et al. (2000) provide a theoretical discussion on the relationship between the
rate of job reallocation within industries and job-speciﬁc( ﬁrm-speciﬁc) shocks. They consider
a monopolistic competition setting with labor as the only mobile factor in the short run. The
shocks are related to both demand and supply and the ﬁrm will adjust employment and output
to fulﬁll the proﬁt maximization condition. The size of the adjustments depends on the slopes
of marginal revenue and marginal product of labor. The elasticity of demand for labor will be
higher, the higher the elasticity of demand for the ﬁrm’s output and the lower the elasticity of
marginal product of labor. If we assume that industries face job-speciﬁc shocks with the same
variance, it is reasonable to expect a positive relationship between intra-industry job reallocation
and the elasticities of marginal revenue and marginal product of labor.
Next, let us say something about the aggregate productivity component, p. This component
is here assumed to be locality-speciﬁc, where all jobs within the same local jurisdiction are
aﬀe c t e db yt h es a m ea m o u n ta n di nt h es a m ed i r e c t i o n .T h u s ,p is an aggregate price component
and is equally distributed for local jurisdictions within a region, i.e., a risk-sharing group k, but
is assumed to be idiosyncratic across localities.2 The locality-speciﬁc and job-speciﬁcs h o c k sa r e
assumed to be independent.
The procedure of creating a vacancy is costly for the ﬁrm. Hiring costs are often assumed to
be proportional to productivity (Pissarides, 2000). When a position is ﬁlled it generates value to
the ﬁrm. Job destruction depends both on the quit rate of workers and on the proﬁto fﬁrms. The
worker’s decision to accept a job oﬀer or to opt for unemployment depends on the expected value
of search for a new job, i.e. the wage oﬀered by the employer plus the value of unemployment.
The worker pays income tax to the central government and an unemployed individual receives
some unemployment income. The individual is also eligible for other transfers, e.g., sickness
beneﬁts, child allowances and supplementary allowances, which will aﬀect disposable income
and therefore also the individual’s decision to work.
Pissarides (2000) shows that unemployment beneﬁts and employment taxes decrease job
creation and increase job destruction by increasing the cost of labor for ﬁrms. Here we are
interested in the case where tax-transfer policies are used in order to insure against income risk.
Thus, we are interested in separating out the stabilization part of the ﬁscal system from other
factors such as redistribution. Hence, stabilization involves pooling the risk of locality-speciﬁc
shocks between asymmetrically aﬀected localities, with the intention to decrease the impact of
the shock. The more diverse the localities within each region are, the larger will be the eﬀect of
risk sharing, which in turn means that the region as a whole will be less sensitive to such shocks.
For a given pattern of job-speciﬁc shocks in the region we would therefore expect risk sharing
2In Sweden functional labor markets consist of groups of municipalities. The counties are often larger than a
single labor market region and, except for the case of Stockholm, do rarely contain municipalities belonging to a
diﬀerent county. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the localities within a county form a risk sharing group.
3to reduce the rate of job reallocation in the economy as long as policy is directed towards ﬁrms.
However, if risk sharing is directed towards individuals, such as unemployment beneﬁts, sickness
beneﬁts, and supplementary allowances, then it is reasonable to believe that the stabilization
mechanism augments the cost of labor for ﬁrms, as previously shown by Pissarides (2000).
As Pissarides (2000) points out, policy directed towards other goals than to internalize ex-
ternalities, e.g., redistribution and stabilization, should be designed so that it does not inﬂuence
the equilibrium outcome (at least not in the long run). The motivation for stabilization policy is
to insure against large variations in disposable income and to smooth the income path over the
business cycle. In this sense, it is therefore possible to allow policy, e.g., unemployment beneﬁts
and taxes, to aﬀect the equilibrium outcome in the short and medium run. However, it is not
desirable for stabilization policy to have long-run aﬀects and distort labor market eﬃciency.
3 Measuring stabilization
Assume the economy consists of a number of risk averse agents. Further, the localities in which
the agents reside are aﬀected by idiosyncratic shocks which means that there is room for sharing
the risk among a group of localities (risk-sharing group) in order to stabilize income; in other
words, there is room for some sort of insurance to smooth the short-run variation in income. The
ﬁrm may handle risk by varying its composition of factors of production or by turning to the
private insurance market. The individual, on the other hand, may handle risk by investing in
human capital, which improves her ability to adopt to new technology. Due to, e.g., information
asymmetries, the central government can step in and act as an insurer, by pooling the risk via
the national tax and transfer systems.












where Xkjt is gross personal income in municipality j l o c a t e di nr e g i o nk at time t and Ykjt is
the disposable value of Xkjt obtained after deducting net national tax payments (national tax
payments minus national transfer payments),4 and δi is a regional term, which captures possible
drift elements of the disturbance term (Mélitz and Zumer, 2002). To eliminate the eﬀects of
shocks that are common to all localities in all regions,5 we relate all variables to their national
counterpart.6
3This approach was originally put forward by Asdrubali et al. (1996).
4The resident also pays local and regional taxes and receives transfer payments distributed by the local gover-
ment. However, here we focus on stabilization via the national budget and since the budget of the local government
is not designed to stabilize income across localities, we disregard the local budget parameters.
5Such common shocks may be present even in the case of full risk sharing.
6An alternative approach that also has been used in the literature is to introduce time ﬁxed eﬀects.
4Let us take a closer look at the interpretation of the parameter γ.Av a l u eo fγ =0indicates
full risk sharing, since the variation in income is not at all reﬂected in Y . This means that a
change in income is fully absorbed by ﬁscal institutions, which leaves income after risk sharing
(disposable income) unaﬀected. However, if γ =1 , there is full pass-through in the system, i.e.,
the variation in income is fully reﬂected in disposable income, which suggests that there is no
risk sharing. In other words, 1 − γ(= β) indicates the extent of risk sharing that is provided in
the economy.
By realizing that personal income (X) minus disposable income (Y )i sn e tt a x e s( T), the
slope of the regression of net taxes on the variation in personal income, β, indicates the amount
of risk sharing that is provided by the ﬁscal system. We control for national shocks by dividing
each variable by its respective aggregate (national) value; Xt =
P
i Xit and Tt =
P
i Tit.M o r e
formally, estimates of β are obtained by estimating the following equation separately for each













where β is interpreted as the incremental smoothing obtained via ﬁscal ﬂows. Note that we
also allow for regional ﬁxed eﬀects in equation (2). Unfortunately estimating (2) leaves us
with a time-invariant measure of stabilization. As an alternative we will therefore also evaluate
stabilization at each time period for each region by using the prediction of (2), rendering also
variation over time.
4M e a s u r i n g j o b ﬂows







where Laikt denotes employment in plant a in industry i located in region k at time t,a n dLikt
denotes employment in industry i located in region k at time t. For each industry and year we
observe employment for each plant in that industry and calculate the change in employment
share from one year to the next according to equation (3). The plants are followed over time
and a plant with data for employment up to and including year t, where data are missing from
year t +1and after, is classiﬁed as an exit. A plant with positive employment from t +1 , but
where previous data are missing, is classiﬁed as an entry. Intra-industry gross reallocation of
jobs consists of reallocation that takes place due to expansion of existing plants or entry of new
plants in industry i located in region k at time t, JCikt (job creation), and reallocation that
5takes place due to downsizing of existing plants or exits of plants, JDikt (job destruction), i.e.,
JRikt = JCikt + JDikt. Since we cannot fully distinguish whether the entries and exits that we
observe are true entries or exits or rather arise from activities such as mergers and acquisitions,
we will only include continuing plants, i.e., existing plants that grow or shrink. Results including
entries and exits can be found in Table A1.
As discussed in Section 2, the rate of job ﬂows within industries is related to the slopes of
the ﬁrm’s marginal revenue and marginal product of labor. In the empirical analysis it is not
possible to measure these slopes directly. Instead, it is common in the literature to consider
various characteristics that are expected to be related to the slopes. According to Davis et
al. (1996), ﬁrms and industries tend to restructure counter-cyclically. General changes in the
labor market for each region and industry are captured by the growth in employment. Further,
Antelius and Lundberg (2003) ﬁnd that the Swedish rate of intra-industry job turnover is lower
in concentrated industries with limited competition. Here we use a Herﬁndahl index to capture
concentration.
We also include a variable describing the educational attainment. According to human cap-
ital theory (Becker, 1964), we would expect individuals to acquire training at an early stage in
order to maximize returns to education. In addition, training may improve the matching and,
therefore, reduce the incentives for ﬁrms to ﬁre workers and for workers to seek other employ-
ment. This suggests that there is a negative relationship between the rate of job reallocation
and the skill intensity in the region.
Based on the discussion above, the estimating equation is given by
Jkt = α + δSSk + δH lnHkt−1 + δG lnGkt−1 + δEEkt−1 +  kt (4)
where Jkt = JRkt,JC kt,JD kt, i.e., the average regional job reallocation, JRkt =
XnR
i JRikt/nR,
job creation, JCkt =
XnC
i JCikt/nC, and job destruction, JDkt =
XnD
i JDikt/nD,r e s p e c -
tively, and the δ’s are parameters to be estimated. Sk is the extent of stabilization among
municipalities within region k, Hkt−1 is the average Herﬁndahl index in region k, Gkt−1 is aver-
age employment growth, Ekt−1 is the share of inhabitants with higher education, and  kt is an
error component. The independent variables are given by their initial values at time t − 1.
5 The data
The empirical analysis is based on a data set covering 20 Swedish regions (counties) during the
period 1989-2000. Due to changes in the industrial classiﬁcation system in 1993 and in 2001, it
is not possible to link disaggregated data neither prior to 1989 nor after 2000 with data for the
period 1989-2000. When estimating the degree of stabilization of income shocks via the national
tax and transfer systems in Sweden we will use a longer time period, 1983-2001. Since data for
6transfers are incomplete prior to 1983, the estimation period for stabilization will be restricted
to the period after 1983.
Stabilization: The Swedish municipalities are divided into risk-sharing groups, where the
risk-sharing groups and counties coincide.7 Since the county and municipality of Gotland (an
island in the Baltic Sea) coincide, it is not possible to obtain estimates for stabilization for
Gotland. Therefore, Gotland is dropped from the analysis. Data originate from the income-tax
returns ﬁled by individuals and are aggregated to municipality level in each region (county). All
monetary values have been deﬂated by the consumer price index (1980 = 100), and are divided
by population to calculate per capita values. Further, each variable is divided by the overall
Swedish real per capita income, tax payments and transfer payments, respectively, to obtain the
relative values as motivated in Section 2.
T h ei n c o m ev a r i a b l e ,X, used in the estimation of equation (2) is the average real income
among municipal residents assessable for national tax measured as total personal income (em-
ployment income and income of business) minus general deductions and deductions for loss. Net
taxes, T, consist of tax payments minus transfer payments. Tax payments are measured as the
real per capita tax payment to the national government by residents in the municipality. Tax
payments include both payments due to employment income and income of capital.
The central government distributes transfers to the households. National transfers to the
households made up about 20 percent of the national budget in the beginning of the 1980s and
about 30 percent at the end of the 1990s. Transfers are here measured as the real per capita
pure transfer payments, i.e. transfers that are not eligible for taxation, distributed by the central
government to the households. These transfers consist of child allowances, housing allowances,
pension, sickness beneﬁts, study allowances, supplementary beneﬁts, and unemployment bene-
ﬁts. Our data set diﬀers in one important aspect with the one used by Andersson (2004). In
the present study we are able to separate out the full set of national transfer payments that are
eligible for taxation from the gross income for individuals residing in each municipality. This
facilitates a more accurate estimation of stabilization via net taxes.
Job ﬂows: Data for employment by plant and industry have been obtained from the admin-
istrative Regional Labor Market Statistics (RAMS) database, compiled by Statistics Sweden.
Plants are classiﬁed by 5-digit industry code according to SNI92, which is based on NACE. The
plants are also classiﬁed according to county location. The data set contains employment data
7The Swedish public sector is structured into three levels of government: local governments (municipalities);
regional governments (counties); and the central or national government. Municipalities provide a variety of
services such as child care, education and care for the elderly, while the counties are mainly responsible for
health care. The main source of income for municipalities and counties is local and regional income taxes,
respectively. Central government’s main responsibility is the provision of national public goods, such as defence
and redistribution. The latter involves both distributional policy towards the private sector and redistribution
within the public sector in the form of intergovernmental transfers.
7for all sectors of the economy; Laikt is employment in plant a in industry i l o c a t e di nr e g i o nk
at time t. This leaves us with 744 industries across all sectors of the economy that are used to
calculate the average job ﬂows in each region. Further, in the RAMS database we can observe
the number of plants in each industry which is used to calculated the Herﬁndahl index measured
as
Xni
a=1(SHaikt)2,w h e r eSHaikt is the share of plant a in industry i.
Education is measured as the share of inhabitants with a post-secondary education in the
region. Data originate from the Swedish Register of Education compiled by Statistics Sweden.
6 Empirical results
6.1 Stabilization
Table 1 gives the descriptives of personal income, national tax payments and national transfer
payments to individuals residing in municipalities located in diﬀerent regions in Sweden. It is
clear that the income of an average individual residing in the region of Stockholm (the capital
area) is much higher than for the average individual in any other region in Sweden. The average
tax payments are on average much higher in this area as well. However, there is much variation
in both these variables for the Stockholm region, which indicates large disparaties between
individuals. The lowest average income is found in the region of Jämtland, which is located in
the north of Sweden. Interestingly, national transfer payments received by individuals residing
in northern Sweden8 is lower than national transfer payments received by individuals residing
in the south of Sweden.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Equation (2) is estimated with municipality speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Some of the series show
evidence of ﬁrst order autocorrelation. We therefore also allow for an AR1 process that is
common for all panels (municipalities) in each regression. Both set of results are presented in
Table 2. Pooling all municipalities of Sweden, and thereby restricting stabilization to be equal
for all regions, we ﬁnd that approximately 16 percent of a shock to income is stabilized via the
national tax and transfer systems in Sweden. This means that when income falls by one krona,
net tax payments adjust and absorb part of the change such that disposable income falls by only
0.84 krona, on average.
Let us next look at the regional structure of income shocks absorbed via the ﬁscal system.
The point estimates in Table 2 vary between 0.103 for Kronoberg (the point estimate 0.012 for
Västerbotten is not statistically signiﬁcant) and 0.546 for Jönköping. This means that between
10 and 55 percent of a change in income is smoothed among the municipalities through the
8Dalarna, Gävleborg, Västernorrland, Jämtland, Västerbotten and Norrbotten.
8ﬁscal system. The estimate for Jönköping is extremely high and we have therefore checked for
outliers. A closer look at the data does however not reveal any particular pattern that would
raise our suspicions. In line with previous results by Andersson (2004), based on similar data,
we ﬁnd that there are regional diﬀerences between the extent of stabilization provided by the
Swedish ﬁscal system.9 However, the results presented in Table 2 generally indicate a higher
degree of stabilization than previously reported by Andersson (2004). As mentioned above in
the data section, we are in the present study able to more fully account for national transfer
payments and separate them out from gross income eligible for taxation. In addition, here we
also control for autocorrelation.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
6.2 Job ﬂows, net taxes and stabilization
Summary statistics for the right-hand side variables in (4) are presented in Table 1. Approxi-
mately 50 percent of the reallocation of jobs took place between continuing plants, while real-
location due to entry and exit represents approximately 25 percent each. Focusing on job ﬂows
for continuing plants, the interpretation of the mean value of job reallocation, 0.154, is that, on
an annual basis, approximately one out of 13 jobs was reallocated due to job destruction and
job creation in the representative industry and county. Including entries and exits we ﬁnd that
the corresponding number is one out of seven jobs that are reallocated in Sweden. Though this
latter is a rather high number in an international comparison, it is in line with those reported
by e.g. Antelius and Lundberg (2003) who also use Swedish data. Most of the variation of job
reallocation, creation and destruction takes place over time (the ’within’ component) while there
is much less variation among counties (the ’between’ component).
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Figure 1 depicts the average regional job ﬂows between 1989 and 2000. In the beginning of
the 1990s, Sweden found itself in a deep recession which is also reﬂected in a high rate of job
reallocation. There is a large gap between destruction and creation of jobs at this time, and it
9One tentative explanation may be found by looking at the case of unemployment compensation. The national
government sets the basic principles for whether a person is entitled to unemployment compensation and for
what length of time. There are 21 regional social insurance oﬃcies in Sweden, one in each county, with local
agencies. The individual case of entitlement is therefore decided upon by the the local employment agencies
and case studies by, e.g., Lundin (2000) have found signs of regional diﬀerences in the interpretation of the basic
principles. An interesting study by Riksförsäkringsverket (2003) [The National Social Insurance Board] has looked
at various parts of the social insurance system to see whether for instance early retirement, sickness beneﬁts and
unemployment compensation are used interchangebly (and hence, not quite consistently with the rules of each
beneﬁt program) and at a diﬀerent extent in regions.
9is the rate of destruction that pushes the gross reallocation rate up since the rate of creation
decreased. At around 1993/94 we see an upturn in the economy which is also reﬂected in Figure
1 where the rate of creation and destruction intersect, eventually leading to more jobs being
created than destroyed. This general pattern of a negative correlation between job creation and
destruction is similar for all counties, and in line with previous empirical results (see, e.g., Davis
and Haltiwanger, 1999). However, there are some regional diﬀerences in variability over the
business cycle.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation (4).10 The ﬁr s tc o l u m no fe a c hj o bﬂow
category (Jkt = JRkt,JC kt,JD kt) refers to estimates of a fully pooled regression containing a
common intercept. Note that the variable of interest, i.e., stabilization, is time-invariant which
precludes us from including region speciﬁce ﬀects. We therefore cluster standard errors at the
regional level. The second column of each dependent variable tabulates results when using a
time-variant measure of stabilization obtained by the prediction of equation (2).11 In this case
we include region speciﬁce ﬀects to control for unobserved characteristics such as labor market
conditions. As an alternative we will also present results when using the observed net tax-income
ratio, without any attempt to distinguish between whether taxes and transfers are payed with
the aim to stabilize economic shocks or to redistribute income across individuals. These latter
results are presented in the third columns.
The results show a positive and signiﬁcant correlation between the degree of stabilization and
the rate of job creation. This suggests that when the tax and transfer systems provide a high
degree of stabilization of a shock to income, more jobs are created. However, it does not appear
as if the degree of stabilization has any eﬀect on job destruction and does not aﬀect the overall
regional job ﬂow activity.12 Bear in mind that the degree of stabilization is time invariant and
it is possible that the stabilization parameter picks up regional unobserved diﬀerences rather
than eﬀects due to ﬁscal policies aimed at absorbing income shocks. We therefore in a next step
evaluate the extension of regional stabilization of income variation by using the prediction of (2)
for each region; see column two of each speciﬁcation of Jkt in Table 2. According to the results,
income stabilization in the Swedish regions tends to decrease the amount of intra-industry job
10Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of the time series indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no serial
correlation.
11Murphy and Topel (1985) suggest that the covariance matrix of the second-step estimation, i.e., the estimation
of equation (4) including the time-variant prediction of stabilization, should be corrected to account for the
uncertainty in the parameter estimates from the ﬁrst step regression of equation (2). In practise we cannot
proceed with this correction due to non-conformity of the dimension of the matrices. Therefore, we have to rely
on the White (1980) correction of the covariance matrix and be careful with the inference from these estimations.
12When also including job ﬂows that arise due to entry and exit, the signiﬁcant eﬀect of the degree of stabilization
on job creation disappears while we ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on job destruction; see Table A1.
10creation. The eﬀect on intra-industry job destruction and overall job reallocation is positive,
but not statistically signiﬁcant.
In the third colums of Table 4 we report results where we include the net tax-income ratio
in each region, without any attempt to separate out the stabilizing part of the tax-transfer
systems. Now comparing the results in columns two and three we ﬁnd similar eﬀects of the net
tax-income ratio and predicted stabilization of income shocks, with the only diﬀerence being
that all eﬀects now are signiﬁcant (the negative coeﬃcient on job creation is much larger - in
absolute terms - in column two than column three). Thus, the overall net tax-income ratio
has a more extended eﬀect on job ﬂow activities in the Swedish regions than the part of the
ﬁscal system which explicitly is aimed at absorbing income variation due to asymmetric shocks
within the region. What is the rationale for these results? As described in the data section,
net taxes consist of tax payments by individuals to the central government and transfers to the
households in terms of child allowances, housing allowances, pension, sickness beneﬁts, study
allowances, supplementary beneﬁts, and unemployment beneﬁts. The ﬁscal system can be used
to redistribute income between individuals, stabilize income shocks, and/or internalize market
imperfections.
In column two we try to separate out the part of the systems that aims at absorbing income
variation for individuals over time, while we in column three capture the overall eﬀect of ﬁscal
policies. According to the results in Table 4 it appears as if the cushioning of income shocks
only slows down the job creation in regions, while an overall higher rate of net taxes will also
increase the rate of intra-industry job destruction and job reallocation. In regions where the
outside option of, e.g. unemployment beneﬁts are more readily available, the rate of successfully
creating new jobs will be slower. Thus, these results are in line with expectations put forward in
Section 2, i.e., that stabilization policy directed towards workers tends to increase hiring costs
for the ﬁr ma n dt h e r e b yg i v e sr i s et ol e s sj o b sb e i n gc r e a t e d .
Let us next look at the other results in Table 4. There is a negatively signiﬁcant correlation
between the rate of job ﬂows and employment growth which suggests a counter-cyclical pattern
of the gross rate of job reallocation. As previously reported by e.g. Davis et al. (1996) and
Antelius and Lundberg (2003), job creation is counter-cyclical while job destruction is pro-
cyclical. Further, there is less job creation among plants located in regions with concentrated
industries, measured by the Herﬁndahl index, (the coeﬃcient is only signiﬁcant in the ﬁxed
eﬀects estimations), which is in line with our expectations. However, it appears as if rate of
job destruction within industries is high in regions with a low degree of competition. In sum it
appears as if the overall regional intra-industry job reallocation is not aﬀected by the average
degree of concentration in the regional economy.
The results in Table 4 also suggest that there is less intra-industry job creation, on average,
in regions where the population is well educated. If hiring costs are proportional to productivity
11and productivity is related to education, then it is reasonable that there will be a negative eﬀect
of education on job creation. This negative eﬀect is however outweighted by a positive eﬀect on
job destruction leaving job reallocation unaﬀected by education. These results are in contrast to
what would be expected according to the traditional human capital model (Becker, 1964), where
education presumably increases the chances of a good match between employer and employees
and thereby decreases job turnover.
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Since our data set contains the whole economy, it is possible that the characterization varies
between diﬀerent sectors. We therefore divide the data set according to four major industries
and re-run equation (4) separately for these following industries: 1. Agriculture, hunting, ﬁshing
and minerals; 2. Manufacturing; 3. Services; 4. Public sector, education and health care.13 The
results are presented in Tables A2-A5 and show that job ﬂows in the public sector (sector 4)
are unsensitive to the mechanisms of the ﬁscal system in Sweden as measured here, while the
net tax-income ratio is positively related to job destruction in the other sectors. Further, there
is a negative eﬀect of the net tax-income ratio on job creation only in the service sector. When
trying to separate out the stabilizing mechanism of the tax-transfer systems we ﬁnd that there
is a higher rate of contraction between continuing plants in manufacturing and less expansion
within the agricultural sector in regions where the system absorbs a large part of the variation
to income. Thus, the character of the diﬀerent sectors make them more or less susceptible to
the mechanisms of the ﬁscal system as measured here.
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The objective of this study is to analyze how job ﬂows are aﬀected by a mitigation of the inﬂuence
of shocks to income within Swedish regions. By using the approach suggested by Asdrubali et
al. (1996) we ﬁnd that national tax and transfer payments absorb approximately 16 percent of a
shock to personal income, on average in Sweden. There are however regional diﬀerencens where
the degree of stabilization varies between 10 and 55 percent depending on in which region the
individual resides.
Next, based on an administrative panel data set covering all sectors in 20 Swedish regions,
1989-2000, we calculate regional job ﬂows and separate between expansion and contraction of
continuing plants in the regional economy. Controlling for unobserved regional eﬀects ﬁnd that
a high net tax-income ratio tends to decrease the rate of jobs that are created and increase
the rate of job destruction, increasing the overall rate of job reallocation in the regions. In an
13The average rate of job reallocation among continuing plants is 0.127 (0.032) in sector 1, 0.138 (0.018) in
sector 2, 0.165 (0.011) in sector 3, and 0.166 (0.020) in sector 4. Standard deviations are given within parentheses.
12attempt to separate out the part of the national tax-transfer system that is aimed at stabilizing
t h ei n c o m ep a t ho v e rt i m ew eﬁnd that only job creation is aﬀected, i.e., regions where the
income path is more stable tend to have a lower rate of intra-industry job creation.
Other results conﬁrm the counter-cyclical pattern in job ﬂows that has previously been found
in the literature. Though, it appears as if the overall regional job reallocation within industries
is not aﬀected by the average degree of concentration in the regional economy. The results also
indicate that there is a negative relationship between education and job creation which may
be explained by higher hiring costs for more productive workers. On the other hand we ﬁnd
that the average level of education is positively related to job destruction, leaving overall job
reallocation unaﬀected.
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15Table 1: Summary statistics of personal income, national tax payments and national transfer
payments in SEK by region in Sweden, 1983-2001
Region Income Taxes Transfers
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev
Stockholm 50345.6 11305.5 4706.1 3332.9 1851.2 667.6
Uppsala 41899.0 6472.2 2509.2 1082.1 1818.0 750.8
Södermanland 42769.8 6161.7 2392.6 993.6 1882.3 646.1
Östergötland 39253.7 5787.4 2160.9 861.4 1760.9 691.6
Jönköping 39903.6 5783.5 2422.9 1100.5 1671.9 598.3
Kronoberg 39474.9 5572.3 2196.4 781.7 1655.1 616.4
Kalmar 38662.5 5734.5 2035.2 757.2 1652.3 614.0
Blekinge 41082.0 5830.6 2219.7 861.2 1718.7 646.1
Skåne 40738.2 6409.8 2589.6 1127.7 1827.9 750.9
Halland 39908.4 6229.7 2511.8 1015.0 1728.7 650.0
Västra Götaland 40007.2 6281.4 2248.6 948.5 1684.1 615.1
Värmland 40495.2 5498.4 2075.3 947.4 1616.3 611.5
Örebro 41779.5 5376.2 2146.7 968.3 1697.6 642.9
Västmanland 41610.9 5845.2 2174.3 1012.5 1743.4 630.5
Dalarna 40204.8 5442.8 2063.1 894.5 1623.0 573.6
Gävleborg 40914.5 5771.6 2059.3 962.2 1648.2 585.2
Västernorrland 42105.7 5725.5 2215.1 971.9 1598.4 604.0
Jämtland 38263.7 5298.5 1784.0 773.4 1633.5 590.3
Västerbotten 39024.1 5134.2 1869.3 831.5 1638.0 650.6
Norrbotten 41304.6 6037.3 2017.0 993.5 1568.2 553.3
Sweden 41228.1 7202.4 2430.8 1532.7 1709.9 647.1
Note: Per capita values in ﬁxed prices (1980=100). Taxes and transfers refer to national tax payments and
national transfer payments by/to individuals residing in municipalities located in each region. Unweighted
averages.
16Table 2: Regional stabilization of personal income in Sweden, 1983-2001
Region FE, excl. AR structure FE, incl. AR structure
Coeﬀ.t - v a l u e R 2 Coeﬀ.t - v a l u e R 2 ρ AR-test No. of obs.
Stockholm 0.033 3.28 0.023 0.176 7.93 0.225 -0.361 30.39 *** 450
Uppsala 0.173 4.88 0.174 0.156 4.56 0.198 -0.141 1.56 108
Södermanland 0.058 5.35 0.167 0.056 5.24 0.167 -0.190 0.00 142
Östergötland 0.162 5.21 0.109 0.158 4.92 0.110 -0.155 4.44 * 234
Jönköping 0.546 3.51 0.058 0.620 3.68 0.058 -0.478 2.66 198
Kronoberg 0.123 2.52 0.044 0.103 2.05 0.043 -0.244 14.65 *** 144
Kalmar 0.161 4.99 0.108 0.146 4.49 0.111 -0.110 2.26 216
Blekinge 0.236 4.04 0.157 0.226 3.37 0.165 -0.353 5.41 * 90
Skåne 0.190 8.60 0.118 0.194 8.38 0.123 -0.286 20.11 *** 594
Halland 0.086 1.47 0.024 0.043 0.68 0.022 -0.355 2.58 108
Västra Götaland 0.103 8.04 0.067 0.138 8.75 0.101 -0.248 11.68 *** 904
Värmland 0.274 16.64 0.481 0.274 16.42 0.488 -0.239 7.01 ** 288
Örebro 0.163 6.55 0.181 0.146 5.58 0.198 -0.254 5.06 ** 203
Västmanland 0.174 6.03 0.155 0.157 5.04 0.159 -0.288 6.48 ** 198
Dalarna 0.227 7.18 0.160 0.192 5.93 0.147 -0.194 0.29 270
Gävleborg 0.215 6.97 0.218 0.184 5.50 0.219 -0.272 13.35 *** 180
Västernorrland 0.252 6.64 0.249 0.248 6.24 0.299 -0.171 3.42 126
Jämtland 0.304 20.78 0.444 0.282 10.02 0.454 -0.095 0.53 144
Västerbotten 0.012 1.21 0.006 0.216 7.73 0.196 -0.022 1.88 268
Norrbotten 0.172 8.89 0.239 0.145 7.04 0.250 -0.220 2.64 252
Sweden 0.062 13.43 0.034 0.161 21.10 0.115 -0.338 7.32 *** 5135
Note: Results are based on estimations of equation (2) and include regional ﬁxed eﬀects. In the ﬁrst set of
results any AR structure is excluded, while in the second set of results we allow for a common AR1 process for
all panels. The AR-test refers to a Woolridge test (F-test) for autocorrelation in panel data, with H0:n o
ﬁrst-order autocorrelation. *, **, *** indicates signiﬁcance on the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent level.
17Table 3: Summary statistics, 1989-2000
Mean Standard deviation
Overall Between Within
Job reallocation 0.306 0.025 0.011 0.022
Job creation 0.150 0.014 0.005 0.013
Job destruction 0.155 0.026 0.007 0.025
Job reallocation, only continuing plants 0.154 0.010 0.004 0.009
Job creation, only continuing plants 0.075 0.010 0.003 0.010
Job destruction, only continuing plants 0.079 0.014 0.003 0.014
Predicted change in relative net taxes 2.3E-5 1.5E-3 2.1E-4 1.5E-3
Net tax-income ratio 0.111 0.055 0.040 0.038
Herﬁndahl index 0.022 0.002 0.006 0.006
Employment growth -0.014 0.031 0.005 0.031
Education 0.058 0.012 0.015 0.008
Note: Variables are given in levels and not in logs, except for the variable Predicted change in relative net taxes.
This latter variable is reported in logs.
18Table 4: Determinants of regional job reallocation, job creation and job destruction, 1989-2000,
including only job ﬂows in continuing plants
Job reallocation Job creation Job destruction
OLS FE FE OLS FE FE OLS FE FE
Deg. of stabilization 0.163 0.435 -0.136
(1.65) (3.91) (-0.81)
Stabilization pred. 0.403 -9.393 7.523
(0.18) (-2.26) (1.33)
Net tax-income ratio 0.238 -0.573 1.073
(1.93) (-4.39) (4.67)
Herﬁndahl -0.392 -0.087 0.726 -3.084 -8.496 -6.727 2.148 8.177 5.142
(-1.08) (-0.13) (1.01) (-5.28) (-4.30) (-3.68) (2.93) (4.52) (3.56)
Empl. growth -0.985 -0.815 -0.882 2.444 2.509 2.734 -3.930 -3.689 -4.033
(-10.06) (-7.62) (7.03) (14.17) (12.95) (14.69) (-19.56) (-16.19) (-15.48)
Education 0.054 -0.048 -0.088 -0.018 -0.559 -0.416 0.125 0.469 0.258
(1.66) (-0.61) (-1.05) (-0.68) (-3.37) (-2.80) (2.08) (2.53) (1.54)
Constant -1.742 -2.024 -2.151 -2.603 -3.986 -3.550 -2.279 -1.439 -2.101
(-17.33) (-9.25) (-9.20) (-30.08) (-8.90) (-8.73) (-12.41) (-2.83) (-4.59)
Adjusted R2 0.271 0.322 0.343 0.448 0.460 0.474 0.522 0.558 0.608
F-test (4,19) 28.71 23.58 22.87 149.94 120.53 121.39 117.55 106.90 102.76
No. of obs. 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220
Notes: Heteroskedasticity corrected t-values in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level.
The columns marked FE refer to within estimates including region speciﬁce ﬀects. Critical value for
F0.05(4,19) = 2.90.
19Table A1: Determinants of regional job reallocation, job creation and job destruction, 1989-2000,
including continuing plants as well as entries and exits
Job reallocation Job creation Job destruction
OLS FE FE OLS FE FE OLS FE FE
Deg. of stabilization -0.198 0.024 -0.435
(-1.27) (0.17) (-2.26)
Stabilization pred. -4.875 -12.371 2.513
(-1.82) (-3.26) (0.65)
Net tax-income ratio 0.040 -0.274 0.471
(0.46) (-2.65) (2.87)
Herﬁndahl 1.847 3.875 3.904 -0.126 -4.669 -3.604 3.724 12.342 11.032
(3.19) (7.43) (7.94) (-0.19) (-2.75) (-2.23) (5.21) (7.19) (7.04)
Empl. growth -1.235 -0.942 -0.915 0.723 1.137 1.306 -2.980 -2.835 -2.979
(-10.67) (-8.86) (-8.06) (6.35) (6.60) (10.01) (-15.06) (-15.68) (-14.19)
Education 0.059 -0.037 -0.016 0.009 -0.744 -0.632 0.109 0.691 0.603
(1.12) (-0.53) (0.25) (0.15) (-4.66) (-4.33) (1.84) (3.61) (3.34)
Constant -1.053 -1.406 -1.351 -1.866 -3.942 -3.612 -1.631 -0.202 -0.480
(-6.68) (-7.13) (-7.45) (-10.91) (-9.13) (-9.03) (-9.20) (-0.38) (-0.97)
Adjusted R2 0.314 0.565 0.557 0.064 0.237 0.210 0.454 0.574 0.587
F-test (4,19) 42.69 46.83 42.37 30.44 35.66 48.35 75.15 72.02 70.01
No. of obs. 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220
Notes: Heteroskedasticity corrected t-values in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level.
The columns marked FE refer to within estimates including region speciﬁce ﬀects. Critical value for
F0.05(4,19) = 2.90.
20Table A2: Determinants of regional job reallocation, job creation and job destruction, 1989-
2000, including only job ﬂows in continuing plants, in sector 1: Agriculture, hunting, ﬁshing and
minerals
Job reallocation Job creation Job destruction
FE FE FE FE FE FE
Stabilization pred. 5.296 -22.604 29.627
(0.53) (-1.74) (1.58)
Net tax-income ratio 0.681 -0.673 1.979
(1.38) (-0.86) (2.29)
Herﬁndahl 0.035 0.406 1.861 1.430 -1.673 -0.542
(0.06) (0.74) (2.37) (1.67) (-2.01) (-1.03)
Empl. growth 0.353 0.274 0.725 0.803 0.187 -0.042
(1.53) (1.14) (1.64) (1.69) (0.56) (-0.13)
Education 0.174 0.341 1.073 0.961 -0.587 -0.146
(0.75) (1.46) (2.55) (2.21) (-1.34) (-0.56)
Constant -1.572 -1.361 -0.667 -0.691 -3.586 -3.126
(-2.77) (-2.49) (-0.63) (-0.67) (-3.60) (-4.50)
Adjusted R2 0.222 0.230 0.121 0.116 0.107 0.125
F-test (4,19) 1.55 1.98 4.68 3.63 1.30 1.33
No. of obs. 220 220 220 220 220 220
Notes: Heteroskedasticity corrected t-values in parenthesis. The columns marked FE refer to within estimates
including region speciﬁce ﬀects and standard errors clustered at the regional level. Critical value for
F0.05(4,19) = 2.90.
21Table A3: Determinants of regional job reallocation, job creation and job destruction, 1989-2000,
including only job ﬂows in continuing plants, in sector 2: Manufacturing
Job reallocation Job creation Job destruction
FE FE FE FE FE FE
Stabilization pred. 3.818 -24.745 22.543
(1.03) (-1.63) (1.82)
Net tax-income ratio 0.021 -0.499 0.981
(0.09) (-1.42) (1.80)
Herﬁndahl -8.733 -8.662 -21.893 -21.103 3.653 1.115
(-1.35) (-1.39) (-1.94) (-1.99) (0.27) (0.09)
Empl. growth -0.470 -0.474 2.588 2.558 -3.180 -3.078
(-3.80) (-3.98) (7.55) (7.21) (-8.07) (-8.67)
Education -0.289 -0.306 0.162 0.267 -0.448 -0.535
(-2.29) (-2.67) (0.72) (1.37) (-1.72) (-2.36)
Constant -2.650 -2.703 -1.768 -1.433 -4.105 -4.404
(-5.69) (-6.36) (-2.09) (-1.95) (-4.05) (-4.94)
Adjusted R2 0.109 0.107 0.308 0.295 0.597 0.434
F-test (4,19) 6.22 5.76 36.95 29.57 60.06 25.41
No. of obs. 220 220 220 220 220 220
Notes: Heteroskedasticity corrected t-values in parenthesis. The columns marked FE refer to within estimates
including region speciﬁce ﬀects and standard errors clustered at the regional level. Critical value for
F0.05(4,19) = 2.90.
22Table A4: Determinants of regional job reallocation, job creation and job destruction, 1989-2000,
including only job ﬂows in continuing plants, in sector 3: Services
Job reallocation Job creation Job destruction
FE FE FE FE FE FE
Stabilization pred. -0.331 3.731 -4.984
(-0.15) (1.05) (-0.93)
Net tax-income ratio 0.113 -0.505 0690
(1.20) (-2.67) (4.02)
Herﬁndahl 3.273 2.635 -39.236 -35.963 41.177 36.722
(0.50) (0.40) (-2.41) (-2.16) (3.46) (2.94)
Empl. growth -0.439 -0.470 1.441 1.559 -2.141 -2.302
(-4.84) (-4.95) (6.56) (6.31) (-9.46) (-9.29)
Education -0.002 0.001 0.046 0.031 -0.124 -0.104
(-0.02) (0.01) (0.21) (0.14) (-0.77) (-0.65)
Constant -1.879 -1.871 -1.576 -1.627 -3.713 -3.643
(-11.60) (-11.41) (-4.57) (-4.98) (-11.36) (-11.68)
Adjusted R2 0.390 0.394 0.546 0.564 0.597 0.620
F-test (4,19) 7.67 7.98 49.48 54.52 60.06 56.67
No. of obs. 220 220 220 220 220 220
Notes: Heteroskedasticity corrected t-values in parenthesis. The columns marked FE refer to within estimates
including region speciﬁce ﬀects and standard errors clustered at the regional level. Critical value for
F0.05(4,19) = 2.90.
23Table A5: Determinants of regional job reallocation, job creation and job destruction, 1989-
2000, including only job ﬂows in continuing plants, in sector 4: Public sector, education and
health care
Job reallocation Job creation Job destruction
FE FE FE FE FE FE
Stabilization pred. -2.353 -5.561 0.158
(-0.35) (-0.54) (0.02)
Net tax-income ratio 0.086 0.026 0148
(0.39) (0.08) (0.61)
Herﬁndahl -2.472 -2.638 1.168 0.442 -7.902 -7.602
(-0.82) (-083) (0.23) (0.09) (-1.22) (-1.21)
Empl. growth -0.442 -0.464 1.133 1.139 -1.989 -2.038
(-2.24) (-2.56) (3.19) (3.00) (-4.91) (-5.06)
Education 0.179 0.190 0.121 0.140 0.197 0.203
(1.66) (1.90) (0.84) (0.95) (1.25) (1.32)
Constant -1.168 -1.137 -2.222 -2.136 -1.553 -1.203
(-3.73) (-4.11) (-7.84) (-7.69) (-2.95) (-3.18)
Adjusted R2 0.221 0.221 0.169 0.167 0.167 0.168
F-test (4,19) 3.10 3.31 4.21 4.52 6.99 6.90
No. of obs. 220 220 220 220 220 220
Notes: Heteroskedasticity corrected t-values in parenthesis. The columns marked FE refer to within estimates
including region speciﬁce ﬀects and standard errors clustered at the regional level. Critical value for
F0.05(4,19) = 2.90.
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